Comments

Toward a Just Model of Alienability
of Human Tissue
By BRIAN BUDDS, R.N., M.S.*

"Will you buy my hair?" asked Della.

"I buy hair," said Madame. "Take yer hat off and let's have a sight
at the looks of it."
Down rippled the brown cascade.
"Twenty dollars," said Madame, lifting the mass with a practised
hand.
"Give it to me quick," said Della.
_ 0. Henry, The Gift of the Magi'
WE
LIVE IN a time of remarkable technological advancement that
holds with it the promise of great benefit to mankind. One need only
look at daily headlines to see evidence of this advancement and the
direct and potential advantage to human health. In particular, medical science is beginning to take the knowledge learned about the basic
human genome and apply it to treating debilitating diseases.2 Often,
in what may seem to be science fiction, the source of these great benefits is the human body itself, including portions of the body that may
be diseasedi
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1. 0. HENRY, The Gift of the Magi, in THE BEST SHORT STORIES OF 0. HENRY 1, 3 (Bennett A. Cerf & Van H. Cartmell eds., Random House, Inc. 1945) (1899).
2. See FDA Clears Study to Inject Gene in Parkinson'sPatients,N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 11, 2002,
at A30.
3. See Cancer Vaccine Test Has Promising Result, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 14, 2002, at C7
(describing how a cancer vaccine harnesses the patient's own immune system to fight the
disease).
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As the body becomes the stuff of which products are made, the
issue of its ownership becomes paramount. To date, the most widely
significant authority on the subject is the California Supreme Court
case Moore v. Regents of the University of California.4 That controversial,
and influential, decision held that use by researchers of cells removed
from a patient's body did not support an action for conversion-the
wrongful taking and use of another's property. 5 The court stated that
a patient who unknowingly has cells harvested does not retain a property interest in those cells."
In reaching this decision, the highly divided court seemed keenly
aware of the policy considerations that would emerge, and advised
that such matters are "more appropriately the subject of legislative deliberation and resolution. '7 Indeed, the breadth of the policy issues
related to the ownership of human tissues is illustrated in cases that
rely on Moore. These cases deal with issues as diverse as whether survivors maintain a quasi-property right in a decedent's tissue,8 whether a
patient has any property rights over cells used in routine diagnostic
procedures," whether a researcher must disclose an intention to seek
a patent on his genetic disorders research,"' whether a stillborn fetus
is "tissue" that may be dissected, '' and whether a party may own the
2
right to commercialize a "cell line" from cells used in research.'
There has been significant academic comment on the Moore decision, much of it centering on whether a person should have the right
to sell his own tissue. Some have argued that the very language of a
4.

793 P.2d 479 (Cal. 1990).

5. See id. at 493.
6. See id.at 489.
7.

1d. at 488, 493.

8. See Bauer v. N. Fulton Med. Ctr., 527 S.E.2d 240, 243 (Ga. Ct. App. 1999) (holding
that appellant family member maintained a quasi-property right in tissue taken from deceased's body).
9. See Cornelio v. Stamford Hosp., No. CV 960155779, 1997 Conn. Super. LEXIS
1928, at *23-26 (Conn. Super. Ct. Jul. 17, 1997) (holding that a patient did not have
property rights in tissue taken for use in diagnostic test).
10. See Greenberg v. Miami Children's Hosp. Research Inst., 208 F. Supp. 2d 918, 923
(N.D. I11.
2002) (holding no personal jurisdiction in a case where plaintiff alleged damages
from not being informed of physician's intent to seek patent on research based on samples
provided by plaintiff).
11. SeeJanicki v. Hosp. of San Raphael, 744 A.2d 963, 970 (Conn. Super. Ct. 1999)
(holding that there was a greater duty of care in handling a fetus than in handling human
tissue).
12. See Miles v. Scripps Clinic & Research Found., 810 F. Supp. 1091, 1095 (S.D. Cal.
1993) (holding that there exists a right to commercialization of a cell line).
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property analysis is insufficient and improper for this issue. 13 Others
counter that the fairest approach is the predictable and practical law
of property.

14

One commentator, Charlotte Harrison, has recently tried to
achieve some middle ground in the debate. 5 Her approach, based on
a liability rule of compensation for human tissue, suggests that neither
the pure market nor a complete proscription of alienability of tissue is
the answer to this complex problem.' 6 Rather, Harrison proposes a
model of compensation predicated on the perceived justice in compensating tissue donors when their contribution has led to a commer17
cially successful endeavor.
Absent a clear national policy, this Comment suggests that the
approach taken by Harrison, though flawed, may hold the seeds of a
just methodology for managing this significant issue. Use of a partial
liability rule, in which a collective valuation model replaces the pure
market, may in fact address many of the concerns of those who fear a
market driven exchange of human tissue. However, this Comment
parts with Harrison and argues that fairness demands such a valuation
take place at the time of tissue donation, not only if a product
achieves commercial viability. Part I of the Comment reviews the holding in Moore and related cases in order to give perspective on the
problem. Part II looks at the response to Moore and suggests that such
issues be discussed with regard to three general areas: the need to
protect individuals from being unduly influenced to donate tissue, the
need to protect clinical research from any "chilling effect," and the
larger impact on society of the choice to permit the "commodification" of human tissue. Part III introduces the approach taken by Harrison and her attempt to find a middle ground.
Part IV, while critiquing the assumptions underlying the Harrison
model, suggests that her approach contains the groundwork for a
more just methodology. Part V addresses which components must exist in such a model and recommends next steps.
13. See Richard Gold, Owning Our Bodies: An Examination of Property Law and Biotechnology, 32 SAN DIE;o L. REV. 1167, 1171 (1995) (arguing that property discourse is insufficient
for discussing the values attached to the human body and its parts).
14. See William Boulier, Note, Sperm, Spleens, and Other Valuables: The Need to Recognize
Property Rights in Human Body Parts, 23 HOFSTRA L. REV. 693, 701 (1994) (recommending
that the law of property is best suited for protecting the rights in one's own body).
15. See Charlotte H. Harrison, NeitherMoore nor the Market: Alternative Models for Compensating Contributors of Human Tissue, 28 Am. J.L. & MEo. 77, 78 (2002).
16. See id.
17. See id. at 93.
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Background: The Moore Decision and Beyond

In Moore v. Regents of University of California," the plaintiff had
been receiving treatment for leukemia at the defendant's hospital. A
researcher, a research institute, a major pharmaceutical company, and
the plaintiff's physician were also named as defendants. All of the defendants were aware that the plaintiff's blood and other tissue contained substances that were of potentially great commercial value in
developing viable treatments. The defendant physician also had a consulting relationship with the Genetics Institute. Without disclosing either the commercial potential or the business relationships to Moore,
and under the rubric of treatment, the defendants harvested Moore's
spleen and blood cells and created a "cell line" from some of these key
blood components. ". The defendants then applied for a patent on the
cell line.
The plaintiff sued on a theory of conversion claiming, inter alia,
that he maintained a property interest in the harvested cells, that the
interest had been tortiously converted, and that he had a proprietary
interest in any product created from his cells.2 1 Importantly, Moore
also claimed that the defendant physician had breached a fiduciary
duty to the plaintiff by failing to disclose the nature and extent of his
research or his economic interests in that research. 2' It was on this
latter theory that the court found for the plaintiff, holding that "a
physician who is seeking a patient's consent for a medical procedure
must, in order to satisfy his fiduciary duty and to obtain the patient's
informed consent, disclose personal interests unrelated to the patient's health, whether research or economic, that may affect his med22
ical judgment."
With regard to the issue of conversion, however, the court found
for the defendant. They reasoned that there were two significant policy considerations that must be balanced-the right of patients to
make medical decisions and the ability of researchers to engage "in
socially useful activities."23 The court suggested that the former is well
protected by the concept of informed consent and fiduciary responsi18. 793 P.2d 479 (Cal. 1990).
19. As the court explains in footnote two, a cell line consists of cells that are taken
from the body and cultured or supported in reproduction outside of the body. This process allows for the acquisition of certain genetic knowledge, as well as making cells available for research over time. See id. at 481, 482 n.2.
20. See id. at 487.
21. See id. at 483.
22. Id. at 485.
23. Id. at 493.
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bility,2 4 and that allowing a tort of conversion would clearly threaten

the latter by imposing a burden on researchers and the biotechnology
industry.2 5 Accordingly, the court held that "the use of excised human
26
cells in medical research does not amount to a conversion.
The majority's opinion is strongly supportive of the researchers'
interest and rejects legal arguments that might impede beneficial progress of research on a host of diseases.2 7 Indeed, in what might have
been an unwittingly accurate turn of phrase, the court recognized the
enormous policy implications of the situation by suggesting that to
allow a cause of action for conversion "will hinder research by restrict28
ing access to the necessary raw materials."
It is important to note that this divided court struggled, at times
eloquently, with the difficult moral and philosophical questions that
attend this issue. For example, in a concurring opinion, Justice Arabian recoiled from the concept of a sale of some portion of the
human body for profit, saying of the plaintiff: "He entreats us to regard the human vessel-the single most venerated and protected subject in any civilized society-as equal with the basest commercial
commodity. He urges us to commingle the sacred with the profane.
29

He asks much."

Similarly, in the dissent, Justice Broussard articulated the unresolved policy issues associated with this subject. In particular, the
majority's holding that the plaintiff did not maintain an interest in
cells that had been excised, did not change the fact that it is the patient who maintains the right to determine the uses of his body parts
prior to their removal. 0 Further, and most important for this discussion, Justice Broussard noted that the concerns regarding the deleterious effects of a commodification of the human body were not
addressed by the court's decision:
Far from elevating these biological materials above the marketplace, the majority's holding simply bars plaintiff the source of the
cells, from obtaining the benefit of the cells' value, but permits
defendants, who allegedly obtained the cells from plaintiff by im-

proper means, to retain and exploit the full economic value of
24.
25.

See id.
See id.

26.
27.
28.
29.
30.

Id.
See id.at 494.
Id. (emphasis added).
Id. at 497 (Arabian, J., concurring).
See id. at 499 (Broussard, J., dissenting).
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their ill-gotten
gains free of their ordinary common law liability for
1
conversion.
This theme is carried on in another dissent by Justice Mosk, who
noted that in scientific research, donors, while not clearly participating in the invention of a product, are "providing the researchers with
unique raw materials" that make the invention itself possible.3 2 To
permit researchers "to freely mine or harvest valuable physical properties of the patient's body" would allow for the exploitation of research
subjects, the consequent degradation of their bodies, and the potential unjust enrichment of the researchers at the expense of the donor."" This last concern becomes clearest when considering that the
parties-researcher and patient-are not in equal bargaining
3 4
positions.
While Moore has not resolved these key issues, its influence has
been significant. Notably, in a case that involved a dispute between
researchers over the right to commercialize a cell line from donated
cells, one federal district court found that there was such a right to be
protected, but that an action for conversion does not provide the appropriate remedy.3 5 The court repeated concern for the chilling impact that actions for conversion might have on scientific
development."! However, they noted that the concern is less when the
property is in the hands of researchers: "[T]he chilling effect on medical research that the Moore court feared is not identical here since the
parties developing the cell lines are sophisticated researchers capable
of protecting themselves legally, not patients who may be unaware of
3 7
the economic uses for discarded body parts."
II.

Discussion

The issues presented by Moore are multifaceted. Both the majority 1 and the dissents" noted the complexity of the policy issues, and
suggested that the judiciary was not the proper place for their
resolution .41
38

31.
32.
33.
34.
35.
36.
37.
3
8.
39.
40.

Id. at 506 (Broussard, J., dissenting).
Id. at 512 (Mosk, J., dissenting).
Id. at 516.
Id.
Miles v. Scripps Clinic, 810 F. Supp. 1091, 1098 (S.D. Cal. 1993).
See id. at 1097.
Id.
See Moore v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 793 P.2d 479, 493 (Cal. 1990).
See id. at 498-523.
See id. at 493; see also id. at 498 (Broussard, J., dissenting).
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These larger policy concerns cluster around three issues: the protection of the individuals whose tissue may be involved, the preservation of the integrity of clinical research, and the larger, societal
interests that relate to the issue of alienability or commodification of
human tissue. This section of the Comment will look at each of these
areas and discuss the arguments raised.
A.

Protecting the Individual

The Moore majority, acknowledging the treating physician's potentially competing interests, suggested that forcing disclosure of that
conflict to the patient "may corrupt the patient's own judgment by
distracting him from the requirements of his health.

'4 1

There is a con-

cern based on the potential vulnerability of people who may become
either the subjects of research or, for other reasons, choose to transfer
some portion of their body to another.
That there should be such concern for vulnerable patients is no
surprise. The informed consent approach seen in Western clinical research is based on philosophic traditions that value patient autonomy. 42 Such an emphasis may be seen as an understandable response
to the horrors of excesses and abuses in the research setting. For example, in the mid-20th century, Nazi physicians engaged in horrific
experimentation on human beings. 4 Closer to home, the infamous
Tuskegee Syphilis experiment was a long-term study of the natural history of syphilis in which study participants, all African-Americans, were
denied information or treatment in order to compare the treated disease with the untreated natural history of syphilis. 44 Perhaps even
more heinous, a study of hepatitis among profoundly impaired, institutionalized children in New York allowed for their deliberate
45
infection.
Outside the realm of clinical research, a similar concern has been
raised as to the vulnerability of those who might be induced to sell
some portion of their bodies. Researchers have looked at impoverished kidney donors in India who sought to escape poverty by selling
41. Id. at 484.
42. See Laura A. Siminoff, Money and the Research Subject: A Comment on Grady, I AM J.
BIOETHICS 65, 65 (2001).
43. See ROBERTJ. LIFrON, THE NAZI DorORS: MEDICAL KILLING AND THE PSYCHOLOGY
OF GENOCIDE ) 269-70 (Basic Books 1986).
44. SeeJAMES H.JONES, BAD BLOOD: THE TUSKEGEE SYPHILIS EXPERIMENT 1-2 (Maxwell
MacMillan International 1993).
45. See JONATHAN D. MORENO, UNDUE RISK: SECRET STATE EXPERIMENTS ON HUMANS
249-50 (W.H. Freeman 2000).
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their organs. 46 Noting the failure of those who donated, to receive
what they had been promised, one researcher underscored that the
problem is one of the poor being induced to sell their organs, a situation that would not be the same for those who were not poor or
desperate.

47

Clinical research provides very few guidelines, but a rich discussion of the ethics of paying research participants may provide insights
into this issue. There are two key ethical arguments against paying
research subjects: first, to do so would take advantage of a person's
particular vulnerability, and second, the participant may already be
receiving a benefit from the study. 48 Both of these arguments are theoretically applicable to the issue of tissue donation and deserve a
more detailed investigation here.
B.

The Vulnerable Patient

Key to the discussion of patient vulnerability is whether the factors that bear on a patient's choice to participate in clinical research
may be subject to undue influence. 49 Indeed, federal regulations governing human research forbid both coercion and the exercise of undue influence. 511 What makes an influence undue is a matter of great
dispute. It has been suggested that any influence that is excessive or
inappropriate diminishes a person's autonomous choice to participate

51
and could be considered undue.

Thus, the undue influence analysis may hinge upon whether the
person so influenced has a decreased choice with regard to voluntary
participation. For example, does such a person find the participation
unwelcome, but because of the irresistible nature of the inducement,
find himself unable to refuse?5 This concern takes on greater significance when the participant is potentially more vulnerable because she
46. See Madhav Goyal et al., Economic and Health Consequences of Selling a Kidney in India,
288JAMA 1589, 1589 (2002) (describing study in which poor people sold a kidney, used
proceeds to pay off debts and then, on average, saw their family income decline).
47. See id. See also Eric Nagourney, Rx Money: When People Sell Their Kidneys, N.Y. TiMES,
Oct. 8, 2002, at F6.
48. See Neal Dickert & Christine Grady, Wiat's the Priceof a Research Subject? Approaches
to Payment for Research Participation, 341 NEw ENG. J. MEnD. 198, 198 (1999).
49. See Christine Grady, Money for Research Participation:Does It Jeopardize Informed Conset?, 1 AM. ]. BioiirT-ucs 40, 40 (2001).
50. See 45 C.F.R. § 46.111 (1991) (stating the requirements for informed consent in
clinical research including the goal of minimizing the risk of "coercion or undue
influence").
51. See Dickert & Grady, supra note 48, at 198.
52. See id.
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is ill. 5 3 This argument posits that a researcher has an obligation to

protect an unhealthy study participant from being unduly influenced,
i.e., finding the inducement to participate so excessive or inappropriate that the subject would not properly attend to the necessary choices
54
about her health.
It is undoubtedly this fear of exploiting a person's vulnerability
that underlies the discussion of undue influence and distinguishes it
from other examples of compensation. An attempt to influence a person's behavior by remuneration-even seemingly excessive remuneration-is normally not rejected in other contexts. For example, there is
no argument against using money to attract workers to do dangerous
jobs. "Most people accept financial compensation for dangerous work,
such as construction, mining, and deep sea diving. ' '5 5 However, inducing a person to choose a particular treatment for a serious disease or
to donate a portion of their own body gives us pause in a way that
inducing healthy people to engage in a particular line of work does
not.
There are at least two understandable reasons for this hesitancy
when it comes to issues of health. First, the horrific examples of exploitation of vulnerable human subjects discussed above are within
our collective memory and should stay there as a warning against any
such future behavior. Second, and perhaps more germane, is the realization of how easily an ill patient can be influenced to make a choice
of a treatment option. At least one physician has noted the inordinate
ability to shape a patient's choice that lies within his power:
I could get most of my patients to participate in almost any kind of
clinical study. They would swallow new drugs, receive infusions of
calcium or glucagon, or even embrace esophageal or rectal catheters because they had faith5 6in my goodwill or, I now fear, because
they wanted to please me.

53. See David B. Resnick, Research Participation and Financial Inducements, I Am.J.
BIoErHics 54, 55 (2001) (This article discusses, inter alia, the differences in expectations
between healthy volunteers and those who are ill. Resnick suggests that there is a problem
known as the "therapeutic misconception" in which a patient, despite proper informed
consent, perceives there will be a benefit from participation in a trial whether or not the
belief is reasonable.).
54. See id.
55. Julian Savulescu, The Fiction of "Undue Inducement": My Researchers Should Be Allowed to Pay ParticpantsAny Amount of Money for Any Reasonable Research Project, I AM. J.
BioETnuc s 2 (2001).
56. Jesse A. Goldner, Dealingwith Conflicts of Interest in Biomedical Research: IRB Oversight
as the Next Best Solution to the Abolitionist Approach, 28J. L. MED. & ETHICS 379, 392 (2000).
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Perhaps the most effective counter argument is that suggested by
Christine Grady, who acknowledges that there are times when inducements-for example, a large amount of money offered to a destitute
person to participate in a study-may be so great as to unduly influence. 57 She raises a crucial question in response to this issue: "[D] o we
protect such people by allowing them to participate in ...research

without receiving money or by not allowing them to participate at
all?" 58 She challenges researchers to do more careful analysis of all of
the factors that go into a participant giving informed consent and not
relying on the elimination of pecuniary reward as a guaranty against
59
undue influence.
Others have echoed this need to look at the question of influence
more broadly than by limiting it to the issue of payment. The very
context in which research is performed may be the source of many
different influences that come to bear on the potential participant. It
has been argued that the greatest concern is not that a patient might
be induced to enter a study, but that she might be induced to enter a
study that lacks the basic safeguards to reduce risks of harm to the
participants."," Indeed, precluding payments to patients so as to not
unduly influence them does not even begin to address the influence
that might be brought to bear on the same patient whose physician
has been paid to recruit participants for the study.6 ' As one researcher
has put it:

The ethical duty of the research community is not to be "thought
police" guarding against subjects' making decisions for the
"wrong" reasons, but to assure that the research we are asking subjects to consider participating in is not so onerous or so dangerous
that participation
would seriously threaten their health and
2
safety."
In short, the issue of whether an influence is undue or not is
anything but simple. There are no bright lines offered. Rather, the
analysis becomes one that includes the nature of the inducement as
well as the status of the party being induced. The dollar amount of the
offered inducement should be considered to rationally judge whether
a person may be unduly influenced. The offer of a large amount of
money may simply be one influence among many. Such an offer, how57.

See Grady, supra note 49, at 42.

58.
59.
60.

Id.
See id.
See Rebecca Dresser, Payments to Research Participants:The Importance of Context, 1

AM. J.BioF-ri-ics 47, 47 (2001).
61.
62.

See id.
Siiminotf, supra note 42, at 65.
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ever, in the context of extreme poverty, lack of true medical choices
(or information), a desperate medical condition, and strong influence
of a physician may become part of a total influence that effectively
reduces a person's choice to refuse participation. It is hard to imagine
a confluence of influences that would similarly diminish the would-be
deep-sea diver's ability to refuse an offer of employment. Thus, while
the analogy to dangerous employment is strong, it may not be perfectly applicable in the area of research on human subjects.
C.

Patients Already Receiving Benefit

Another issue is the appropriateness of payment when the participant is already receiving a benefit by virtue of participating in the research.' !- The premise of this argument is that a study participant may
already be receiving treatment as compensation for any value that he
provides to the study, and thus, should not receive further payment.
This argument has been criticized on several grounds. First, there are
clinical studies in which patients participate and the benefit to them,
if any, is unclear. 6 4 Further, even though a patient may benefit, there
is no reason that payment must necessarily be unavailable.6 5
How this issue relates to the alienability of tissue may be seen in a
hypothetical involving ongoing clinical research. Consider that a major pharmaceutical company is conducting research of an anti-viral
medication for a disease such as HIV/AIDS. The medication being
tested is proving effective in the treatment of the disease. The nature
of the agreement between the patient and the researching companyas clearly spelled out in the informed consent form-is that the patient will participate in the study, give frequent blood samples in order
to monitor the safety and efficacy of the treatment, and receive the
indicated treatment for a defined period of time. Thus, the agreement between patient and researcher amounts to an exchange of the
patient's time, effort, and willingness to monitor his body's response
to treatment for a guarantee of treatment.
However, consider if the research sponsor were doing some related testing. For example, alongside the testing of this treatment they
may be interested in determining if there were patients with a particu-

63.
64.
65.

See Dickert & Grady, supra note 48, at 198.
See id. at 198-99.
See id.
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lar genomic sequence 66 who responded well or poorly to this treatment. This sort of data could lead to important information regarding
the marketability of the agent under study. It is not, however, directly
related to the safety and efficacy of the treatment that the patient is
undergoing. Again, what if this or some other information were best
obtained by way of a tissue biopsy, for example, a liver or lymph node
biopsy? 67 Alternatively, perhaps that tissue is desired by the company
for the possibility of some form of testing that does not yet exist. Are
these situations, in which tissue is taken for the benefit of the researcher, to be seen in the same light as the tissue used to test the
safety and efficacy of the treatment the patient is receiving?
D.

Protecting the Integrity of Research

The arguments related to the protection of the biotechnology industry are well articulated in the Moore decision. The court envisioned
the very serious implications of permitting the plaintiff to sue for conversion as "threaten [ing] with disabling civil liability innocent parties
who are engaged in socially useful activities. ' 68 The majority feared
that a researcher could share human cells with another researcher
and, in effect, broaden the liability to all researchers, even those not
69
directly involved with the initial harvest.
The court, noting the importance of research in human cells,

used dire language to describe a situation that might ensue, sug
gesting that extending liability for conversion "threatens to destroy
the economic incentive to conduct important medical research. ' '7o
66. It is beyond the scope of this Comment to discuss the particulars of clinical research. This reference to genomic medicine highlights the promising, but unknown, future. Genomics is a term used to describe the functions of genes:
The science of genomics rests on direct experimental access to the entire genome
and applies to common conditions, such as breast cancer and colorectal cancer,
human immunodeficiency virus (HIV) infection, tuberculosis, Parkinson's disease, and Alzheimer's disease. These common disorders are also all due to the
interactions of multiple genes and environmental factors. They are thus known as
multifactorial disorders. Genetic variations in these disorders may have a protective or a pathologic role in the expression of diseases.
Alan E. Guttmacher & Francis S. Collins, Genomic Medicine-A Primer,347 NEw ENG.J. MED.
1512, 1512 (2002).
67. "Biopsy" refers to the taking of tissue from a living person for the purposes of
diagnosis. This is often performed in clinical research and can be achieved in a variety of
fashions, some more intrusive than others. The range of methods for acquiring a biopsy is
from a simple taking of a blood sample to the removal of tissue in surgery. See Mosiv's
MEDICAl. DICTIONARY 191 (Kenneth N. Anderson, et al. eds. 4th ed. 1994).
68. Moore v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 793 P.2d 479, 493 (Cal. 1990).
69. See id. at 494.
70. Id. at 495.
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They suggested that each donation of tissue would require a "pedigree" check, a showing that the tissue used comes from a particular
source, 7' and that any researcher that acquires a cell sample
"purchases a ticket in a litigation lottery. '"72
These fears translate into a general concern about the transaction costs involved in the acquisition of human tissue for research.
The argument suggests that if a research company had to secure the
rights to all samples of tissue it needed for its research, the transaction
costs would be prohibitive. 73 It is suggested that the costs go beyond
the actual monetary expenses and include the time and effort ex74
pended in the actual negotiation over tissue.
This argument is not fully convincing in suggesting that a ban on
alienability of tissue is needed to avoid the economic catastrophe
feared by the Moore majority. Indeed, the dissent makes clear that the
contribution of cells is, at best, limited in its claim on economic benefits, and may best be seen as a necessary commodity. 75 Thus, the argument of economic inefficiency may be a bit overblown. As the dissent
notes:
[T]he great bulk of the value of a cell line patent and derivative
products is attributable to the efforts of medical researchers and
drug companies, rather than to the "raw materials" taken from a
patient ... the patient's damages will be correspondingly limited,

and innocent medical researchers and drug manufacturers will retain the
considerable economic benefits resulting from their own
76
work.
The concern is, clearly, that any threat of a chilling impact on
research not serve as a front for protecting other specific, financial
interests of the researchers. The danger is that one motivation can
serve as a hidden way of giving benefit to one party over another,
77
often under the guise of benefit.
E.

Protecting Societal Interests-The Cost of Commodification

The issues surrounding the alienability of human tissue have consequences that reach farther than the researchers and those who provide the tissue for medical research. As noted in Moore, products that
71. Id. at 496.
72. Id. at 495-96.
73. See Harrison, supra note 15, at 87.
74. See id.
75. See Moore, 793 P.2d at 505 (Broussard, J., dissenting).
76. Id.
77. See Guido Calabresi & A. Douglas Melarned, Property Rules, Liability Rules, and Inalienability: One View of the Cathedral,85 HARV. L. REv. 1089, 1115 (1972).
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have been developed through biotechnology have had an enormous
impact on many different human diseases. 78 If, as the majority suggests, there is a chilling effect on research, its reach would be far.
It has also been suggested that the "commodification" of
humans-the treating of human body parts as fungible articles of
commerce-can be degrading to the human spirit. 79 The long-term
societal impact of commodification has been explored and found
frightening in some instances. For example, one commentator has
suggested that allowing the sale of fetal tissue would have an exploitative effect on Black women, given their likelihood to participate in
such a market,811 and thus, should not be permitted.8 '
The appropriateness to speak of the body as property or as a commodity has been questioned. Indeed, it has also been argued that the
very language of property law analysis is grossly insufficient to capture
the magnitude of value that humans impart to the body.82 The concept of allowing one to profit from the sale of the human body has
3
raised great opposition.
Often, the suggested approach to dealing with the ills that would
flow from a free commodification of human tissue is to preclude the
practice and insist that the tissue, when conveyed to another, be
donated.8 4 When the economic analysis of the probable pricing and
availability of fetal tissue leads to an analysis that one segment of the
population would be adversely impacted, the suggested response is to
ban that practice.8 5 This is, essentially, what the Moore court did in
disallowing the plaintiff a property interest in his excised cells.
However, it has been argued that the debate over the commercialization of the human body is mistakenly based on the fiction that
markets in human tissue do not exist.8 6 Indeed, Mahoney claims that
87
not only do such markets exist, but they are extensive and necessary.
78. See Moore, 793 P.2d at 494.
79. See id. at 497 (Arabian, J., dissenting).
80. See Khiara M. Bridges, On the Commodification of the Black Female Body: The Critical
Implications of the Alienability of Fetal Tissue, 102 COLUM. L. Rvv. 123, 124-25 (2002) (arguing
that market forces would cause Black women to be exploited while denying them the benefits, if any, that would accrue firom the donation of fetal tissue).
81. See id.
82. See Richard Gold, Owning Our Bodies: An Examination of PropertyLaw and Biotechnology, 32 SAN Diec;o L. REv. 1167, 1171 (1995).
83. SeeJulia Mahoney, The Market for Human Tissue, 86 VA. L. REv. 163, 10'4-65 (2000).
84. See Bridges, supra note 80, at 127.
85. See id. at 123-25.
86. See Mahoney, supra note 83, at 166.
87. See id.at 208.
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Donated tissue has value added to it at every step of the process toward its intended developmental goal. The only part of the process
denied valuation is the original donation. 88
When one recognizes the impact of this fiction, arguments that
speak of the horrors that will occur if patients or research subjects are
reimbursed-either for their participation or their tissue-seem thin,
at best. For example, it has been argued that the reimbursement of
patients for participation in research will lead to a "tradesman morality" and impair the relationship that ought to exist between the subject and the rest of society.8 9 However, these arguments are based on
the premise that the study participant ought to be motivated by altruism, but impose no such similar moral obligation on the practitioner
conducting the research.
Ill.

Harrison: A Middle Ground?

In Neither Moore nor the Market: Alternative Models for Compensating
Contributorsof Human Tissue, Charlotte Harrison argues that one 'eason no clear policy has emerged on the issue of compensating donors
may be that the legal models used to analyze the issue are inadequate.9 11The ethical and practical complications flowing from a free
market property analysis and the harshness of a complete proscription
of compensation, following Moore, all fail to satisfy the interests at
stake.!' Instead, she argues that an intermediate approach, drawing
on other successful models of compensation, may move us toward an
92
effective policy.

In essence, Harrison acknowledges that many of the arguments
against both a free market approach and an approach of complete
inalienability have merit. She offers a model that accepts parts of both
of the competing views. For example, she suggests that most instances
of human tissue transfers continue to be treated as donations.9 3 However, in those circumstances in which the donated tissue proves to be
"unusually valuable" in the development of a commercially valuable
product, compensation would be in order.9 4 Central to her model is
that such remuneration would be achieved "through a transparent,
88. See id.
89. Tod Chambers, Participationas Commodity, Participationas Gift, I Am.J. BIOETHICS
48, 48 (2001).
90. See Harrison, supra note 15, at 78.
91. See id.
92. See id.
93. See id. at 93.
94. Id.

UNIVERSITY OF SAN FRANCISCO LAW REVIEW

(Vol. 37

collectively-guided process conducted at a distance from the original
contribution.

9 5

Harrison's approach is based on the concept of a liability rule,
which she suggests occupies the middle ground between property
rights and inalienability. 96 The concept is described in a classic work
by Calabresi and Melamed, 97 that argues when one has a property
right in some thing, another may appropriate that right by means of a
voluntary transaction.Y"However, while society may deem that these
parties have a property right, it says nothing about the value of the
thing in question-that is decided in the marketplace. 99 An inalienability rule is even simpler in that the state simply determines that the
thing is inalienable, that the parties cannot transact an exchange, and
thus, value is not an issue. 'M A liability rule permits the exchange, but
value is determined by an objective third party, not by the parties involved. I') There are many reasons why a liability rule might be preferable to a strict property rule. As Calabresi and Melamed note, a
liability rule is often the most economically efficient method when
"the cost of establishing the value of an initial entitlement by negotiation is so great that even though a transfer of the entitlement would
benefit all concerned, such a transfer will not occur." 1' ) While offering eminent domain and accident compensation as examples of situations in which pre-transaction negotiations would be impossible or
impractical, the authors suggest that any situation in which a "market
valuation of the entitlement is deemed inefficient" ' " is one in which a
liability rule or "collective valuation"'' 4 might be superior.
Harrison applies this reasoning to the issue of compensation for
tissue donation. Having noted that one of the major concerns of the
Moore and other courts was the transaction costs associated with a
property rights approach, she suggests that one way to deal with this
would be to allow the setting of value to be done by an objective third
party. 105 Thus, in general, an inalienability rule would apply and tissue
95.
96.
97.
98.
99.
100.
101.
102.
103.
104.
105.

Id.
See id. at 94.
See Calabresi & Melamed, supra note 77, at 1089.
See id. at 1092.
See id.
See id.
See id.
Id. at 1106.
Id. at 1110.
Id. at 1109.
See Harrison, supra note 15, at 97.
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would need to be donated freely and voluntarily. "' However, in those
circumstances where a researcher would have created something of
commercial viability, an independent tribunal would assess the appropriate compensation for those who donated tissue to the development
07
of the product.'
One benefit that would flow from such a model, according to
Harrison, is the decreased transaction costs associated with the tracing
and notification of tissue donors.'0 8 The research company or academic researcher would not have to trace or record all tissue donations, only those associated with an attempt to commercialize a proven
product.' }9 Further, with regard to the cost to the developer, companies would benefit from pricing predictability, as opposed to a price
that is set on the open market.'" Similarly, potential tissue donors
would benefit. There would be no need to engage in pre-donation
negotiation or even be aware of the potential for commercial
development.'
To summarize, Harrison's proposal begins with maintaining a
ban on the private sale of tissue by the donor to the researcher but
allows for remuneration if the donation leads to the development of a
commercially viable product. 112 At the time that a commercial entity is
preparing a product for going to market, it would be required to report the use of any human tissue to an agency or "tribunal" that would
adjudicate the proper compensation. 13 Donors would then be traced,
notified, and compensated where possible.' 14 By donor choice, or in
cases where tracing the donors was not possible, the collecting agency
or some other entity, such as a patient advocacy group, could be desig15
nated to receive the remuneration.'
IV.

Critique of Harrison's Model

The model proposed by Harrison is an attempt to move along
policy with regard to the use of human tissue in research. Indeed, her
efforts seem designed to deal with the fact that since the Moore deci106.
107.

See id.
See id.

108.
109.
110.
111.
112.
113.
114.
115.

See
See
See
See
See
See
See
See

id. at 99.
id. at 97.
id.
id. at 87.
id. at 97.
id.
id.
id. at 98-99.
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sion, and in "twelve years of controversy, no professional consensus or
concerted public policy response has emerged."' 16 Further, her assessment that the central problem involved may be related to the legal
models used is a bold attempt to open up discussion on this issue.
The suggestion that a liability rule may be appropriate in this situation is particularly appealing. As the review of objections to the property rule approach show, even if the transfer of tissue is allowed as
property, one of the key problems is assigning an appropriate value to
tissue. A free market may produce prices that are exorbitantly high
and thereby may lead to coercion.' 17 Further, the price offered may
not be just and there is no assurance it will be paid.' I8 As Harrison
noted, the "true" value of a given tissue may simply be unknowable at
the time of donation given the uncertainty of commercial development or even the nature of the proposed research.' 19 Perhaps opening a free, unregulated market in human tissue is too great a burden
on society. 12" The difficulty in fairly assigning value seems to make
tissue transfer a dilemma in which a liability rule, or some variation on
that, might be appropriate. As noted by Calabresi and Melamed, this
is the sort of circumstance in which society has turned to a liability
rule.' 2 At the very least, this situation represents a moment in which
society might make a choice as to the best method to achieve the goals
of economic efficiency and just distribution, deciding whether "market transactions or collective fiat is most likely" to bring this about.12
There are, however, at least two key problems with the Harrison
approach, both of which involve the time when the tissue donor may
be recompensed. First, in choosing to assign value to a donated tissue
only after the researcher has created a commercially viable product,
she fails to acknowledge the value of the donation prior to that fortuitous moment. Second, the argument that transaction costs would be
substantially lower if compensation were only allowed at the time of
commercial success is based on flawed assumptions.

116.

Id. at 78.

117.
118.

See Bridges, supra note 80, at 123.
See Goyal, supra note 46, at 1591.

119.
120.
mitting
gesting

See Harrison, supra note 15, at 87.
See Mahoney, supra note 83, at 168 (citing reasons that society shrinks from peran unregulated market in human tissue); see also Gold, supra note 13, at 1246 (sugthe market is an insufficient tool for dealing with this issue).
121. See Calabresi & Melamed, supra note 77, at 1106-07.
122.

Id. at 1097.
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The choice to assign value at the moment that a donation has

"commercially utility" 1 23 suggests that Harrison supports, at least par-

tially, the claim made by the plaintiff in Moore that he should have a
proprietary interest in any ultimate product that is derived from his
donation. 124 It most certainly rejects the minority approach, which
suggests that the tissue can be seen as the "raw material" in the process of development.' 2

5

At the very least, her insistence on maintain-

ing a mandatory donative approach at the outset assures a system that,
as Mahoney suggested, prohibits only the original donor from 26commodi ying the tissue-yet, all others in the process may do so.'
This problem becomes clearer if one understands that the value
of the donation to the researcher may not be measured only by the
ultimate commercial success of the endeavor. For example, returning
to the hypothetical AIDS research situation discussed above, consider
that the tissue extracted from the study patients by biopsy has shown
that there is a particular genomic profile that will respond poorly to
the proposed treatment, and that best estimates are that the product
being developed, though effective in some circumstances, will not be
effective broadly enough in the population to be commercially viable.
This knowledge will not translate directly into profit earned by the
researcher, which could be shared with those who donated tissue.
Rather, this knowledge will result in loss. However, this knowledge is
not without enormous value to the company that can use it to suspend
the expensive work of development and shift to another tactic. In
short, this new information enables the company to avoid greater
losses.
Similarly, in situations where a company or researcher is unsure
of the full purpose or nature of the intended research, the donated
tissue may still have some value-even if that value is difficult to assign. The question becomes whether the researcher should have to
pay for this tissue upon serendipitously uncovering a use for it. Thus,
the researcher that froze the biopsy sections for the possibility of future testing has acquired the ability to do that testing whether or not it
ultimately produces a commercially viable product. Moreover, following Harrison's approach, the researcher has acquired the needed raw
materials without any cost to himself.
123.
124.
125.
126.

See Harrison, supra note 15, at 96-97.
See Moore v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 793 P.2d 479, 482 (Cal. 1990).
See id. at 494.
See Mahoney, supra note 83, at 174-75.
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This leads to the second flaw in Harrison's model-the issue of
transaction costs. Her model seems to accept the argument of the majority in Moore that all researchers who deal with human tissue should
27
do a "pedigree" check on the tissue to avoid a charge of conversion. 1
This argument also fails if one allows for a model in which the donation is seen as "raw material" and not as conveying a proprietary interest to the donor. Following the "raw material" line of reasoning, the
transaction costs could be dealt with at the time of donation. Indeed,
it is arguably a more efficient process to assign value at the time of
donation and transact a deal that includes a waiver of any claim of
proprietary interest. Then, whatever value the researcher, company,
or inventor added to the donation would clearly belong to that entity
and one need not expend the energy or cost involved in "tracking
down" those who might have contributed-a situation that Harrison
12
acknowledges is replete with difficulties.
Indeed, a practical matter that makes the model suggested by
Harrison problematic is the time involved. She acknowledges thatjustice may demand remuneration for donors of tissue.1'29 However, to
suggest that such remuneration is not appropriate until commercial
viability is proved-especially in the cases where such tissue is derived
from patients who are participating in clinical trials and are ill-increases the possibility that those patients will be neither found nor
compensated, as many may have died by that time.
Harrison's answer to this problem suggests that, as in punitive
damages in torts, the company, to avoid unjust enrichment, should be
forced to share profits with some third party-an aggregate or patient
advocacy group. '" However, this is removed from the transaction that
seems mostjust, and will most likely increase transaction costs by forcing determinations as to whom the compensation should rightly go.
In short, the laudable effort of avoiding unjust enrichment creates a
potentially significant increase in the transaction costs involved in the
management of this issue.
Lastly, Harrison's recommendation of how to implement her proposal suggests that the proper regulatory body to carry out such a program may already exist. She proposes both the Patent and Trademark
Office and the Food and Drug Administration as organizations that
are currently involved and may be able to monitor the donation of
127.
128.
129.
130.

See Moore, 793 P.2d at 496.
See Harrison, supra note 15, at 99.
See id.
See id. at 99.
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tissue and compensation of patients. 1 31 Analyzing the propriety of selecting one government agency for such a task is beyond the scope of
this Comment. However, the key is to identify the proper stakeholders
and ensure their representation in the process. Whether that could
happen with an existing governmental agency is an open question.
V.

Suggestions for Another Model

One of the benefits of a liability rule is that it can be helpful when
valuation of an entitlement is either impossible or extremely diffi' Further, such a rule is often used "because it facilitates a comcult.I 12

bination of efficiency and distributive results which would be difficult
to achieve under a property rule.""' It is this difficulty in assessing the
value of human tissue that is at the heart of many of the problems that
have been discussed thus far.
For example, the unpredictability of supply and demand can lead
to fears that impoverished organ donors or socially disadvantaged fetal tissue donors may be exploited or degraded. The uncertainty of
the eventual success of biotechnological advances makes it impossible
to know whether one donated tissue sample will be involved in the
creation of a miracle treatment, while another may become medical
detritus. Indeed, the inability of researchers to know with any certainty the cost of their "raw material"-either at the time of acquisition or litigation over a charge of conversion-leads to the "chilling
effect" feared by the Moore court.
At least at some level, this argument is not one of whether there
ought to be any compensation for human tissue. In fact, Mahoney's
arguments that there are already thriving tissue markets are persuasive. 1 3 4 The question, instead, is who is to be paid and how much he will
be paid. Another open question, as evidenced by criticisms of Harrison's model, is when parties ought to be paid for the donated tissue.
Harrison suggests that an independent agency or tribunal should
determine a "contributor's eligibility for compensation and the appropriate amount or percentage of profits to be awarded."' 3 5 This Comment recommends implementation of a policy by which all donations
of human tissue are to be compensated in some form-either by direct remuneration or by services. Thus, such compensation would be131.
132.
133.
134.
135.

Id. at 98.
See Calabresi & Melamed, supra note 77, at 1106-07.
Id. at 1110.
See Mahoney, supra note 83, at 174.
Harrison, supra note 15, at 88.
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come standard and the attendant transactions costs would be
predictable and capable of being budgeted.
The remaining issue for such a regulatory body would then be
the appropriate compensation for the donated tissue. It is well beyond
the scope of this Comment to suggest the exact mechanism by which
such prices or payments would be reached. Unraveling the complexities of arguments regarding methods and models of compensation is
beyond the simple goal of this paper-to provide a suggested ap36 This Comment
proach. '11
suggests that a simple concept of fairnessa weighing of competing valuations-may be sufficient to guide the
process.
A simple example of a liability rule is the doctrine of eminent
domain, where a governmental body attempts to simulate market
forces in assessing value of the condemned or appropriated property.' 3 7 The interests of the parties, the homeowner, and the government, are clear. Also, the difficulty in approximating a market value is
not great-one can look at the market value of comparable properties
and translate it to a figure for the property in question.
The issue of tissue donation, particularly in the context of clinical
research, is not so simple. There are, as we have seen, many different
stakeholders or interested parties. Each may apply a completely distinct method of valuation to the tissue in question. Nor is there "comparable property" that can be used as a guide, particularly in the area
of creative, groundbreaking research.
Thus, the goal of a disinterested, objective, third party charged
with the valuation of human tissue should be to blend the various interests represented in as fair and just a manner possible, while maintaining fundamental protections in the three areas that have been
outlined. Individuals should be protected against exploitation. The integrity of the research process should be protected against a chilling
effect that could cripple it. Moreover, society should be protected
against the excesses of commodification.
A.

Protection of Individuals

A first concern that ought to be considered in assessing the value
of tissue donation is the nature of that donation itself. Here, regula136. See Margaret Jane Radin, Compensation and Commensurability, 43 DUKE L.J. 56, 57
(1993) (comparing models of compensation in tort law); see also Neil Duxbury, Law, Markets and Valuation, 61. BROOKLYN L. REV. 657, 663-74 (1995) (critiquing, interalia, Radin's
arguments against commodification).
137. See Calabresi & Melamed, supra note 77, at 1106-07.
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tors should consider the intrusiveness of the procedure of acquiring
the tissue, the impact of such an acquisition on the donor, and, perhaps, the frequency of donation. For example, the impact on the patient of a tissue donation that consisted of a simple, single blood draw
would be compared to a donation that called for an invasive and painful procedure-for example, a bone marrow donation-on a frequent
basis. Perhaps experts in health care and in research could even devise some sort of scale or formula by which the comparative impact of
procedures could be measured. That measure, then, could serve as
one factor in the overall assessment of value.
A second consideration would be the nature of the context in
which the tissue is sought. Here, the focus is on whether there is some
other benefit accruing to the donor of the tissue. Thus, a healthy volunteer receiving no benefit from a study might be compared with an
ill patient who is receiving treatment in the context of a clinical trial,
such as in the hypothetical noted above. These issues are very difficult,
if not impossible, to quantify. Indeed, it is that very difficulty which
gives support to the use of a liability rule. However, the issue that regulators would focus on here is whether or not the donation of tissue
exceeds the value of the benefit being received. If the tissue donation
were to serve in the monitoring of the safety and efficacy of the original trial, perhaps there would be no call for compensation. On the
other hand, if the donation were for some other purpose, which accrues some benefit to the researcher beyond the original bargained
for .exchange, it would support some level of compensation.
Perhaps the most basic issue with regard to the protection of the
individual is the safety of the process. This is based on the concern
that a patient can be unduly influenced to do something that is perhaps harmful. Here, a regulatory body needs to be assured by the
Food and Drug Administration that the very nature of the research is
not one that would be harmful to human subjects. That said, there are
various risks that attend to the acquiring of human tissue and the participation in clinical research. The nature of these risks could be yet
another factor in assessing just compensation.
B.

Protection of Research

In discussing the protection of research, the focus changes from
the potential donor to the potential payer. If the Moore court's concern about the "chilling" of an industry is to be heeded, then the na-
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ture of the industry itself must be considered. "8 Generally,
considerations should include whether or not a potential human tissue user is engaged in purely commercial research or in basic scientific inquiry, or some hybrid. Here, though, the boundaries are often
not clear-the division is often between academic institutions, whose
inquiry may be more basic science in nature, and for-profit commercial enterprises, whose focus is decidedly the generation of profit.
Furthermore, there are differences among the commercial entities themselves. Some, be they small start-up or large pharmaceutical
companies, may be engaged in groundbreaking, innovative research
that involves significant financial risk. Others may simply wait on the
sidelines, watching the progress of the innovators and, when they see
the right moment, engage in "me too" research by which they can
"pick the low hanging fruit." All of these factors can be considered in
setting the appropriate amount for compensation or the price of the
"raw materials." Innovators can be rewarded by being asked to shoulder less of the overall burden, while those who seek to leverage others'
work into their own profit can be "taxed" by making requirements for
a greater financial contribution. The nature of the exchange of this
information, among and between research organizations, should be
considered. Indeed, the Moore court noted that biological materials
are often shared among researchers.I'" Thus, the nature of the institution's use of the tissue and its willingness to share are factors that can
influence the decision as to a just assessment. For example, a purely
commercial entity, maintaining exclusive control over the materials,
may be asked to pay more than an organization that plans to make the
information gained from the donated material publicly available.
C.

Protection of Societal Interests

The key role for any regulatory body is to consider those aspects
of human tissue transfer that have lasting impacts on the greater society. Here, the issues associated with commodification drive the discussion. Certainly, no single regulatory agency has the power to protect
society against base human instincts. However, Justice Arabian's warning about commingling "the sacred with the profane"' 14" needs to be
addressed.
138. A full examination of all of the factors to be considered is beyond the scope of this
Comment.
139. See Moore v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 793 P.2d 479, 494 (Cal. 1990).
concurring).
140. /d. at 497 (Arabian, J.,
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First, any regulatory entity must begin by acknowledging that
human tissue is, in fact, regularly commodified.1 4' The issue becomes
one of whether we as a society wish to preclude all commodification of
tissue or whether we are content to simply preclude some commodification of tissue. Were we to pursue the former approach, the impact
would be enormous and would include a "chilling" effect on research
42
of a magnitude much greater than that feared by the Moore court.1
To suggest that the evils of commodification are completely avoided
by a proscription on donor compensation are simplistic at best and
disingenuous at worst.
The potential impact of the commodification of tissue on vulnerable populations is perhaps best dealt with by a keen awareness of the
issues of supply and demand. Concerns that relative unavailability of a
type of tissue would drastically increase its price and exert undue influence on vulnerable populations14 3 might be ameliorated by control
of the price. Here, it would be the regulation of the market that provides the protection against the excesses rather than a proscription of
sales. Such regulation can also serve to protect the distribution of rare
tissue by "imitat[ing] the policy followed in more conventional cases
of monopoly power by permitting sales but regulating prices so that
144
they reflect the marginal costs and risks borne by the donor."'
A final issue is who should do this work. Harrison's suggestions of
the Patent and Trademark Office or the Food and Drug Administration seem based in a desire to leverage an already existing structure to
reduce- costs associated with adopting her proposal. 45 Perhaps the
more important issue is whether an agency or tribunal is sufficiently
representative of the stakeholders in the process. It should be
remembered that the basis of using a liability rule is the belief that in
certain circumstances both the economic efficiency argument and the
distributional goals of society are best served by a collective valuation
4
and not one determined only by negotiation of the parties.1 6
This review of the issues involved in the transfer of human tissue
for research should, if nothing else, make clear that the stakeholders
in this transaction are many. Thus, any body that would aim to regu14l. See Mahoney, supra note 83, at 163, 174.
142. See id. at 196-200 (describing the impact of a true noncommodification regime on
all aspects of the research and development of medical products).
143. See Bridges, supra note 80, at 142.
144. Susan Rose-Ackerman, Inalienability and the Theory of Property Rights, 85 COLUM. L.
REV. 931, 949 (1985).
145. See Harrison, supra note 15, at 97.
146.

See Calabresi & Melamned, supra note 77, at 1102-04 .
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late this arena should strive to be representative. All phases of the
industry need to be fully represented-the academic researchers, the
entrepreneurial companies, and the large pharmaceuticals. Patients
and other potential tissue donors must also find representation, perhaps through the participation of patient advocacy groups and other
such representatives. The healthcare industry and professionals, too,
should have input into the process. Lastly, it would be foolish to suggest that such an agency attempt to set value without the input of
economists and others who are able to ascertain trends, both nationally and internationally, that would have impact on this issue.
Conclusion
This Comment has explored the policy issues that flow from the
decision reached in Moore v. Regents of the University of California to
deny property rights to human tissue donors. Until recently this subject has focused only on the issue of whether donors should be compensated or not. A recent suggestion has been made that the use of a
liability rule approach might provide for a more just allocation of
resources.
This suggestion, however, suffers from the flaws outlined above.
In particular, forcing donors to initially donate tissue continues the
injustices that attend to that practice, and mistakenly implies that such
a donation is without value. Further, the problems associated with
postponing the assigning of value until such time as a research product has proved commercially viable have been explored.
Finally, using the liability rule model might allow for a more just
valuation of donated tissue at the time the donation is made. A regulatory body that is representative of all of the potential stakeholders
could assign value and protect the process from the potentially damaging components of market forces.

